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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
PlaintiffTRespondent, 
PEARL TOPANOTES, 
Defendant/Petitioner. 
CaseNo.20010127-SC 
Priority No. 13 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND OPINION BELOW 
This Court granted Petitioner Pearl Topanotes1 Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the 
Utah Court of Appeals in State v. Topanotes. 2000 UT App 311,14 P.3d 695. The Court's 
Order granting the Petition is attached hereto as Addendum A, and the court of appeals' 
decision in Topanotes is attached as Addendum B. Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) and (5) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The issues presented for review are as follows: 
A. Whether the court of appeals erred in failing to resolve on the existing record an 
issue raised by the state for the first time on appeal. 
B. Whether the court of appeals' order of remand for further proceedings and a 
"factual determination" on an issue raised by the state for the first time on appeal was 
fundamentally unfair and in conflict with Utah case law. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: On certiorari, this Court adopts the same standard of 
review used by the court of appeals: questions of law are reviewed for correctness, and 
findings are reversed only if clearly erroneous. State v. Lewa. 951 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 
1997) (cite omitted). The court of appeals reviewed the issues on appeal in this case as 
follows: m[T]he determination of whether an encounter with law enforcement officers 
constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment... is a legal conclusion that we review 
for correctness.'" State v. Topanotes. 2000 UT App 311, j^4 (citing Salt Lake Citv v. Rav. 
2000 UT App 55, % 998 P.2d 274). 
PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENTS 
Arguments Preserved in the Trial Court In the trial court, Topanotes challenged a 
governmental search as unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment. The trial court 
upheld the search and Topanotes appealed the matter to the court of appeals. Topanotes1 
objections to the search are contained in the record on review ("R.") at 29-38 and 88; see 
also R. 98:3-9. 
Arguments Preserved in the Court of Appeals. In the court of appeals, the state 
conceded that the search conducted in this case violated the Fourth Amendment, Topanotes, 
2000 UT App 311, T(8 n.3, then argued for the first time on appeal that evidence discovered 
during the unlawful, warrantless search was admissible against Topanotes under the 
"inevitable-discovery" doctrine. IdL at ^ [10. Topanotes objected to the state's newly raised 
argument on the basis that the record failed to support application of the inevitable-discovery 
doctrine and the doctrine was not a proper alternative ground for affirmance. 
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(See Topanotes1 Reply Brief of Appellant, dated July 14,2000.) 
Thereafter, the court of appeals issued its ruling in the matter. It held that the 
warrantless search was unlawful. Topanotes. 2000 UT App 311, ^ [8. It also determined that 
it had insufficient information to address the issue of inevitable discovery in this case. The 
court of appeals then remanded the case to the trial court for "a factual determination on 
whether the heroin would have been inevitably discovered and for such proceedings as may 
be appropriate." Id, at ^ 12. 
In connection with the court of appeals' remand order, Topanotes filed a petition for 
rehearing, again objecting to the state's argument for application of the inevitable-discovery 
doctrine, and to the court of appeals' remand order for further proceedings on the matter. 
(See Petition for Rehearing, dated December 7, 2000.) The court of appeals denied that 
petition in an order dated December 15,2000. Topanotes has properly preserved the issues 
for review in this case. 
RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following provisions will be determinative of the questions presented for review: 
U.S. Const, amend. IV and XIV, § 1. The text of those provisions is contained in 
Addendum C hereto. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings. Disposition in the Court Below. 
On October 13, 1998, the state charged Petitioner Pearl Topanotes ("Topanotes") 
with unlawful possession of a controlled substance, a third degree felony offense in violation 
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of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1998). (R. 7-8.) 
On July 1,1999, Topanotes filed a motion to suppress the substance giving rise to the 
charge in this case on the basis that the substance was discovered during an unlawful search. 
(R. 29-38.) 
On July 15,1999, the trial court held its first hearing on the motion to suppress. At 
that hearing, the prosecutor called two witnesses to testify in support of the state's claim that 
the substance at issue was admissible in evidence against Topanotes under the Fourth 
Amendment. After both state witnesses testified, the prosecutor specifically represented to 
the trial court that the state had no further evidence to present in connection with the matter. 
(R. 88:29.) Thereafter, the trial court took the motion to suppress under advisement. 
On July 28, 1999, the trial court held a second hearing in the matter, wherein the 
prosecutor specifically represented that he would submit the issue of admissibility on the 
arguments and evidence contained in the record. (R. 98:3.) The trial judge then ruled on 
the matter, denying Topanotes1 request for suppression of the evidence. (R. 98:8.) 
On July 28, 1999, Topanotes entered into a conditional guilty plea (R. 56-66), 
"reserving the right to appeal the denial of her motion to suppress evidence." (R. 60.) The 
trial court entered judgment against Topanotes and sentenced her to an indeterminate prison 
term of up to five years at the Utah State Prison. (R. 56-57.) A copy of the judgment is 
attached hereto as Addendum D. While incarcerated, Topanotes appealed the trial court's 
ruling on the motion to suppress. 
In the court of appeals proceedings, the state admitted that officers engaged in an 
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unlawful seizure when they detained Topanotes during the warrants check that led to the 
discovery of the substance giving rise to the charge in this case. The state also argued for the 
first time on appeal that the unlawfully seized evidence was nevertheless admissible against 
Topanotes under the inevitable-discovery doctrine. (Brief of Appellee, dated May 15,2000.) 
On November 9,2000, the court of appeals issued a published decision in the matter, 
ruling that the officers violated Topanotes1 Fourth Amendment rights when they unlawfully 
detained her for the warrants check. Topanotes, 2000 UT App 311, [^8. The court then 
considered the state's argument concerning application of the inevitable-discovery doctrine 
and determined the record was insufficient on the matter. As a result of the insufficient 
record, the court remanded the case to the trial court "for a factual determination on whether 
the heroin would have been inevitably discovered and for such proceedings as may be 
appropriate." Id. at |^12. 
On December 7, 2000, Topanotes filed a petition for rehearing, asking the court of 
appeals to vacate the remand order for further proceedings, since such a remand was 
unprecedented and unfair. (See Petition for Rehearing, dated December 7, 2000.) On 
December 15, 2000, the court of appeals denied the petition. On February 13, 2001, 
Topanotes requested certiorari review. This Court granted Topanotes1 petition and granted 
an extension of time to October 4,2001, for filing the opening Brief of Petitioner. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
"On October 7,1998[,] three Salt Lake City police officers detained defendant on a 
public street" outside her trailer home, and requested her identification. Topanotes, 2000 
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UT App 311,1(2; (R. 88:9, 21, 27). In response to the request, Topanotes produced an 
identification card or driver's license and handed it to Officer Hansen. (R. 88:9-11.) 
Thereafter, Officer Hansen handed the card to Officer Mitchell and told him to call it in for 
warrants. (R. 88:14,21-22.) Officer Mitchell took the card and left to conduct the check. 
(R. 88:10-11.) 
Officers Hansen and Mitchell admitted that when they encountered Topanotes they 
did not suspect that she was involved in criminal activity. (R. 88:15-16; 88:28); Topanotes. 
2000 UT App 311, f8 n.3. Nevertheless, the officers retained possession of Topanotes1 
property outside her presence to run the warrants check. Topanotes. 2000 UT App 311, [^2. 
When the warrants check was completed, officers discovered an outstanding warrant for 
Topanotes1 arrest. The officers arrested Topanotes and searched her in connection therewith. 
During the search, officers discovered heroin in Topanotes' pocket. She "was ultimately 
charged with possession of a controlled substance." IdL. 
In the trial court, Topanotes filed a motion to suppress admissibility of the substance 
discovered during the warrantless search on the basis that the search constituted an unlawful 
level-two detention. (R. 29-38); see State v. Deitman. 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987); 
Salt Lake Citv v.Smoot 921 P.2d 1003,1006 (Utah Ct. App.), cerL denied. 925 P.2d 963 
(Utah 1996) (in order to legally effect a level-two detention or seizure, the officer must have 
"articulable suspicion" that the suspect has or is about to commit a crime) (citing State v. 
Munsen, 821 P.2d 13.15 n. 1 (Utah Ct. App. 199 n. cert, denied, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992)). 
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On July 15,1999, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the matter, wherein 
the prosecutor presented evidence in connection with his argument that the substance 
discovered during the warrantless search was admissible under the Fourth Amendment. 
(See R. 88; 67-71.) At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court took the matter under 
advisement. 
Thereafter, on July 28, 1999, the trial court held a second hearing. During that 
hearing, the prosecutor specifically represented that he would submit the issue of 
admissibility on the facts and arguments already contained in the record. (R. 98:3.) The trial 
court then entered a ruling on the matter, denying Topanotes' motion to suppress. 
According to the trial court, at all times relevant, the officers were engaged in a consensual 
level-one encounter with Topanotes; the officers discovered the outstanding warrant and 
controlled substance at issue during that consensual encounter. (R. 98:3-9.) 
Prior to the trial court's ruling, the state could not have known whether the court 
would suppress the evidence or find it admissible. In connection with its argument 
concerning admissibility, the state was given at least two opportunities to present the 
evidence it deemed relevant on the matter. (See R. 88; 98:3.) Also, the prosecutor twice 
represented to the trial court that he was satisfied with the evidence and arguments submitted 
by the state on the issue of admissibility. (See R. 88:29; 98:3.) 
When Topanotes appealed the trial court's ruling to the court of appeals, the state 
conceded the trial court erred in its ruling. Specifically, the state admitted that when 
officers asked for and then retained possession of Topanotes' identification card to check 
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for outstanding warrants, the matter escalated to a non-consensual, unlawful level-two 
detention. Topanotes. 2000 UT App 311, ^ [8 n.3. 
While the analysis should have ended with the state's concession, the state's argument 
in the matter continued as follows. 
According to the state, the controlled substance was admissible against Topanotes 
under an alternative theory raised for the first time on appeal: application of the inevitable-
discovery doctrine. The state argued that if the court of appeals found the record in this case 
to be insufficient to support its new theory, "the proper remedy is remand to allow the trial 
court to make the fact sensitive determination in the first instance." (See Brief of Appellee, 
dated May 15,2000, at 11 n.3.) 
On November 11,2000, the court of appeals issued a published decision, remanding 
the case to the trial court "for a factual determination on whether the heroin would have been 
inevitably discovered and for such proceedings as may be appropriate." Topanotes. 2000 UT 
App 311,^11-12. The remand order is improper. Additional facts relating to the issues on 
review are set forth below. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Under Utah law, an appellate court will affirm a trial court's ruling on an alternative 
theory raised for the first time on appeal if the theory is apparent on the record. State v. 
Montova. 937 P.2d 145, 149-50 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (citing Limb v. Federated Milk 
Producers Association. 461 P.2d 290 (Utah 1969)); State v. Chevre. 2000 UT App 6, 994 
P.2d 1278. That means, the existing record must support the alternative theory, otherwise, 
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the appellate court will not consider the matter on appeal. The Utah rule ensures 
fundamental fairness and due process in the proceedings below and on appeal. 
In Topanotes1 case, the state argued for the first time on appeal that the trial court's 
ruling on the motion to suppress should be affirmed under the inevitable-discovery doctrine. 
Inasmuch as the state had raised a new theory for affirmance on appeal, the court of appeals 
was required to assess whether that theory could be sustained on the existing record, or 
whether it must be rejected. The court of appeals refused to engage in that analysis of the 
matter. Rather, it remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. That was 
improper. Topanotes respectfully requests that this Court make the proper assessment for 
the new theory on the existing record, or remand the case to the court of appeals for that 
assessment. To that end, this Court or the court of appeals should find that the existing 
record is insufficient to support the state's argument for application of the inevitable-
discovery doctrine. 
Next, in the event this case is remanded to the trial court, the remand order must be 
limited to proceedings on the existing record. The state may not be entitled to another 
evidentiary hearing on remand in order to present additional evidence in the matter. 
Under state and federal law, the state bears the burden of establishing the admissibility 
of evidence under the Fourth Amendment. To that end, the state's factual predicate for ad-
missibility must be fully developed before appeal. If the state fails to present evidence in the 
original proceedings relevant to the matter, the state is not entitled to a second — or in this 
case, third — opportunity to elicit facts supporting yet a new argument to justify the officers' 
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warrantless conduct. See State v. Hodson. 907 P.2d 1155, 1159-60 (Utah 1995) (the state 
bears the burden of proof and is not entitled to a remand to put on new evidence after 
appeal); State v. Case. 884 P.2d 1274, 1278 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Remand for another 
evidentiary hearing would be fundamentally and procedurally unfair and unprecedented. 
Thus, Topanotes respectfully requests that any remand of this matter to the trial court be 
limited to proceedings on the existing record. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. SINCE THE STATE RAISED THE INEVITABLE-DISCOVERY 
DOCTRINE FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL AS AN ALTERNATIVE 
GROUND FOR AFFIRMANCE. THE COURT OF APPEALS WAS 
REQUIRED TO RESOLVE THAT ISSUE ON THE EXISTING RECORD. 
A. THE DOCTRINE OF AFFIRMING ON AN ALTERNATIVE GROUND 
RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL APPLIES ONLY IF DUE 
PROCESS IS SATISFIED. 
In Limb v. Federated Milk Producers Association. 461 P.2d 290 (Utah 1969), this 
Court articulated the rule for affirming a judgment on an alternative ground raised for the 
first time on appeal: 
The law is well settled that a trial court should be affirmed if on the record made it 
can be. The general law is stated in 5 C.J.S. Appeal & Error §1464(1) as follows: "* 
* * The appellate court will affirm the judgment, order, or decree appealed from if it 
is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record, even though such 
ground or theory differs from that stated by the trial court to be the basis for its ruling 
or action, and this is true even though such ground or theory is not urged or argued 
on appeal by appellee, was not raised in the lower court, and was not considered or 
passed on by the lower court. * * *." 
Limb. 461 P.2d at 293, n. 2; see also Orton v. Carter. 970 P.2d 1254,1259-60 (Utah 1998) 
(separate theories for affirmance were "supported by the evidence," and therefore "apparent 
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on the record," for purposes of the doctrine of affirming on alternative grounds). That 
doctrine comports with due process, as demonstrated in State v. Montova. 937 P.2d 145 
(Utah Ct.App. 1997). 
In Montova, the defendant moved to suppress evidence discovered by police during 
an inventory search of his car. After the trial court upheld the search under the Fourth 
Amendment, defendant appealed, claiming the search was invalid. Id at 148. "The State 
responded on appeal] by conceding that it failed to establish that the inventory search was 
valid, primarily because it wholly failed to demonstrate that the police department had 
standardized inventory procedures and what those procedures were." Id. Thereafter, 
notwithstanding the concession, the state asked the court of appeals to uphold the search on 
alternative grounds. The state asked the court to find that the search was "incident to a lawful 
arrest" and supported by probable cause and exigent circumstances. Id at 148-49. 
In considering the matter, the court of appeals recognized it may affirm the lower 
court's ruling on "any proper ground as long as there is evidence in the record supporting 
such an affirmance." Id. at 149. The court of appeals also stated the following: 
Critical to affirmance is the requirement [that] the ground or theory be "apparent on 
the record." Id. If, in any way, the ground or theory urged for the first time on appeal 
is not apparent on the record, the principle of affirming on any proper ground has no 
application. To hold otherwise would invite the prevailing party to selectively focus 
on issues below, the effect of which is holding back issues that the opposition had 
neither notice of nor an opportunity to address. Because of this due process 
component, "apparent on the record," in this context, means more than mere 
assumption or absence of evidence contrary to the "new" ground or theory. The 
record must contain sufficient and uncontroverted evidence supporting the ground or 
theory to place a person of ordinary intelligence on notice that the prevailing party 
may rely thereon on appeal. 
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Montova. 937 P.2d at 149-50. The court also specified that the alternative ground must be 
"well-briefed" on appeal to be considered. Id. at 150. 
In Montoya. the court of appeals refused to consider new arguments raised first on 
appeal since the facts necessary to establish the new bases for affirmance were not apparent 
from the record and the arguments were not adequately briefed. Id. The state's arguments 
were rejected and the trial court's ruling on the motion to suppress was reversed. IdL 
In Topanotes* case, the court of appeals disregarded the law articulated above. 
Specifically, Topanotes argued in the court of appeals that the trial court erred in 
denying her motion to suppress, where officers engaged in an unlawful "level-two stop 
without the requisite articulable suspicion." Topanotes. 2000 UT App 311, ^ [4. During the 
unlawful level-two detention, officers discovered a warrant for Topanotes1 arrest and they 
searched her in connection with executing that warrant. During the search, officers 
discovered the controlled substance that resulted in the charge in this case. 
On appeal, the state conceded the officers1 conduct was unconstitutional. Topanotes. 
2000 UT App 311, <|[8 n.3. Nevertheless, the state asked the court of appeals to rule that the 
controlled substance discovered during the unlawful detention was admissible against 
Topanotes on the basis that officers inevitably would have discovered that substance if they 
had engaged in a lawful search. (See Brief of Appellee, dated May 15, 2000.) The state 
argued for the first time on appeal that the inevitable-discovery doctrine applied to this case. 
The state's argument constituted a newly raised, alternative ground for affirmance. 
In considering the state's new argument, the court of appeals should have assessed 
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whether the alternative ground was "apparent on the record" and whether the record placed 
a person of ordinary intelligence on notice in the trial court that the state may rely on that 
alternative ground for affirmance on appeal. Montoya, 937 P.2d at 149-50. Instead, the 
court of appeals stated the following: 
Inevitable discovery is a valid exception to the exclusionary rule, see State v. 
Northrup, 756 P.2d 1288,1293 (Utah Ct. App.1988), and "[t]he appropriate standard 
governing the inevitable discovery exception is whether 'the prosecution can establish 
by a preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately would have been 
discovered by lawful means/" State v. James, 2000 UT 80, % 16,405 Utah Adv. Rep. 
31 (quoting Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 81 L.Ed.2d 377 
(1984)). More precisely, the State "fmust show that the evidence 'would have been 
discovered, not simply that it "could" or "might" have been discovered.1" M V. v. 
State, 1999 UT App 104,112, 977 P.2d 494 (quoting Genovesi, 909 P.2d at 923 n. 
8) (alterations in original). 
K 11 Because the trial court ruled that the initial detention was legal, the issue 
of inevitable discovery was not addressed below. "This court has consistently 
recognized that [issues of search and seizure] are highly fact sensitive," State v. 
Lovegren, 798 P.2d 767,770 (Utah Ct. App.1990), and "[i]t is not the function of an 
appellate court to make findings of fact because it does not have the advantage of 
seeing or hearing the witnesses testify." Ruckerv.Dalton, 598P.2d 1336,1338 (Utah 
1979). Moreover, "complete, accurate[,] and consistent findings of fact ... [are] 
essential to the resolution of dispute under the proper rule of law." Id 
T| 12 Therefore, we remand for a factual determination on whether the heroin 
would have been inevitably discovered and for such proceedings as may be 
appropriate. 
Topanotes. 2000 UT App 311,111110-12: see also State v. Howard. 509N.W.2d 764,767-68 
(Iowa 1993) (although the trial court denied the motion to suppress on the basis that the 
warrant was valid, the appellate court affirmed the search on an alternative ground apparent 
in the record: the existing evidence supported consent to search). 
The court of appeals1 remand for a factual determination and further proceedings is 
inappropriate. Such a remand is fundamentally unfair and serves to provide the state with 
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an unprecedented second, or in this case third, "bite at the apple." See infra subpoint I.C., 
and Points II. Topanotes respectfully requests that this Court vacate the court of appeals1 
remand order as it relates to the inevitable-discovery doctrine, and either decide that issue 
here or remand the matter to the court of appeals for a resolution of the issue on the existing 
record. 
B. THE RECORD IN THIS CASE CONTAINS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO 
SUPPORT THE STATES ARGUMENT FOR AFFIRMANCE ON AN 
ALTERNATIVE GROUND RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL. 
1. "Inevitable Discovery" Is a Fact-Intensive Issue. 
The Exclusionary Rule. Pursuant to Fourth Amendment law, when officers engage 
in an illegal search or seizure, evidence obtained in connection therewith will be suppressed 
under the exclusionary rule. The exclusionary rule is a remedy for a constitutional violation. 
See Mapp v. Ohio. 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (rule applies to States via the Fourteenth 
Amendment). It compels respect for the Fourth Amendment, it deters police from invading 
homes and interfering with an individual's personal sanctity in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment, and it removes an officer's incentive to disregard the constitutional guaranty. 
The Inevitable-Discovery Doctrine. The "inevitable-discovery" doctrine is a limited 
exception to the exclusionary rule. It considers, among other things, whether the illegally 
seized evidence "ultimately" would have been discovered through lawful means. Nix v. 
Williams, 467 U.S. 431,444 (1984); State v. James, 2000 UT 80,1J16, 13 P.3d 576. The 
inevitable-discovery doctrine is not an "exception" to the Fourth Amendment warrant 
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requirement.1 It is a fact-intensive doctrine that applies in limited circumstances to block 
application of the exclusionary rule. 
The United States Supreme Court explicitly recognized the inevitable-discovery 
doctrine in Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431. There, officers believed defendant had concealed 
a young girl's body near a road, ditch, culvert or abandoned building between two points on 
the map. See id at 435. An officer in charge of searching the area began the process of 
marking off maps between the two points in a grid fashion, separating 200 volunteers into 
teams, and assigning them to search specific grid areas. Id. at 435, 448-49. Volunteers 
were instructed to concentrate their efforts on roadsides, culverts, ditches, and abandoned 
buildings. Id. 
After volunteers began searching, defendant disclosed the location of the body during 
an unlawful interrogation. Id.at 435-36. The body was located near a roadside ditch in an 
area to be searched under the grid system. Id. at 436, 449. The Nix Court ruled that 
discovery of the body was inevitable as supported by the officers1 testimony concerning the 
lawful, independent investigation relating to the search for the body. Id_at 449-50. 
The Nix Court applied the inevitable-discovery doctrine where the prosecutor 
presented specific facts in the trial court to support that a lawful investigation inevitably 
would have led to the discovery. 
Exceptions to the warrant requirement include consent, plain view, incident to arrest, 
and "probable cause to search plus exigent circumstances." See State v. Lambert. 710 P.2d 
693, 698 (Kan. 1985). 
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In Topanotes1 case, the state failed in the trial court to present evidence of a lawful 
investigation that ultimately would have led to the discovery of the controlled substance 
obtained during the warrantless search. Thus, the inevitable-discovery doctrine cannot apply 
as an alternative basis for affirmance on appeal. 
2. The Facts in Topanotes* Case Do Not Support Application of the Inevitable-
Discovery Doctrine. 
In Nix, the United States Supreme Court reiterated that the inevitable-discovery 
doctrine is not based in speculation. Nix, 467 U.S. at 444, n.5. Rather, its application relies 
on "demonstrated historical facts capable of ready verification or impeachment." Id2 That 
is, in the context of this case, the prosecutor was required to present basic, primary evidence 
of the lawful investigation that would have led ultimately to the discovery of the controlled 
substance obtained during the warrantless search. 
By way of explanation, the factual determinations in Nix were capable of verification 
or impeachment. There, the prosecutor presented evidence in the trial court that ~ absent 
the unlawful conduct - officers ultimately would have discovered the young girl's body in 
connection with a lawful investigation. The evidence of the lawful investigation consisted 
of the following: 
[T]he prosecution offered the testimony of Agent Ruxlow of the Iowa Bureau of 
Criminal Investigation. Ruxlow had organized and directed some 200 volunteers 
who were searching for the child's body. Tr. of Hearings on Motion to Suppress in 
2
 "Historical facts" are facts that are admitted and established in evidence. See Ornelas 
v. U.S.. 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996). They include a recital of the events and credibility 
determinations. The historical facts serve as a basis for the trial court's factual findings. See 
Thompson v.Keohane. 516 U.S. 99,109-10 (1995). 
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State v. Williams, No. CR 55805, p. 34 (May 31, 1977). The searchers were 
instructed "to check all the roads, the ditches, any culverts .... If they came upon any 
abandoned farm buildings, they were instructed to go onto the property and search 
those abandoned farm buildings or any other places where a small child could be 
secreted." Id., at 35. Ruxlow testified that he marked off highway maps of 
Poweshiek and Jasper Counties in grid fashion, divided the volunteers into teams of 
four to six persons, and assigned each team to search specific grid areas. Id., at 34. 
Ruxlow also testified that, if the search had not been suspended because of 
[defendant's] promised cooperation, it would have continued into Polk County, using 
the same grid system. Id., at 36,39-40. Although he had previously marked off into 
grids only the highway maps of Poweshiek and Jasper Counties, Ruxlow had 
obtained a map of Polk County, which he said he would have marked off in the same 
manner had it been necessary for the search to continue. Id., at 39. 
* * * 
There was testimony that it would have taken an additional three to five hours to 
discover the body if the search had continued; the body was found near a culvert, one 
of the kinds of places the teams had been specifically directed to search. 
Mx, 467 U.S. at 448-449. 
Likewise, in U.S. v. Larsen. 127 F.3d 984, 987 (10th Cir. 1997), cert, denied. 522 
U.S. 1140 (1998), the court looked to the primary facts of record in the trial court to 
determine application of the inevitable-discovery doctrine. In that case, officers obtained 
a warrant allowing them to search for and seize certain vehicles and vehicle titles on 
defendant's property. While the officers were executing the warrant, they seized numerous 
unauthorized items, including "bank records." Id.at 985. 
After the items were seized, a state trooper involved in executing the warrant, stopped 
at the local bank for personal reasons. He mentioned to the bank vice president that he had 
recovered vehicles from defendant's property. The bank vice president "became concerned 
because the bank had loaned money to [defendant] for a vehicle." Id. After the officer left 
the bank, the vice president independently pulled his records relating to defendant and sent 
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a Report of Apparent Crime to the FDIC. The FDIC forwarded the Report to Agent 
Crabtree of the FBI. Id 
Meanwhile the state trooper, who had executed the search warrant, independently 
contacted a KBI agent and forwarded the unlawfully seized records to him. The KBI agent 
in turn contacted Crabtree. Id. 
Crabtree investigated the matter, "issued subpoenas and, in accordance with standard 
FBI procedures, began tracing [defendant's] banking activities. This led to issuance of 
subpoenas by a grand jury and discovery of the bank records on which [defendant's] 
prosecution for federal bank fraud and money laundering was based." Id_at 985. 
With the charges against him, defendant moved to suppress all evidence in the matter 
on the basis that officers exceeded the scope of the warrant during the initial search when 
they unlawfully seized his bank records. IdL Defendant argued that the unlawful seizure 
poisoned all evidence discovered thereafter. The district court agreed and determined the 
excessive warrants search was unlawful. However, that court and the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit ruled that the inevitable-discovery doctrine applied and 
would block application of the exclusionary rule. According to the facts, Crabtree ultimately 
would have discovered the fraudulent transactions when he reviewed the Report that the 
bank vice president sent to him. Id. at 986. Since Crabtree ultimately would have 
discovered the fraud through lawful means, the records seized during the excessive search 
were admissible against Larsen under the inevitable-discovery doctrine. 
Pursuant to Nix and Larsen, the inevitable-discovery doctrine is inapplicable to 
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Topanotes' case as a matter of law and a matter of record. The state failed in the trial court 
to present evidence to support application of that doctrine in this case. 
Specifically, the evidence in this case supported a single investigation. Officer 
Hansen encountered Topanotes outside her trailer home and requested an identification card. 
Topanotes produced a card and gave it to Hansen. Thereafter, Hansen handed the card to 
Officer Mitchell, who walked away with the card to run the warrants check, while Topanotes 
remained detained. The officers acknowledged that during the encounter, they did not have 
reasonable articulable suspicion to believe Topanotes was involved in criminal conduct. (R. 
88:16,28.) Nevertheless, the officers continued to retain possession of Topanotes1 property 
and to detain her in connection with the warrants check until her arrest. 
The officers in this case also testified that the investigation they conducted here was 
a matter of "common practice" or routine. (R. 88:16; 88:22.) That is, their routine practice 
consisted of unlawfully detaining a person and retaining possession of her property without 
reasonable suspicion, while conducting a warrants check. (R. 88:16,28 (officers testified 
they had no reason to suspect Topanotes of criminal activity; nevertheless, they retained 
possession of her property and detained her for a warrants check as a matter of routine).) 
The routine or common practice in this case consisted of an unlawful detention. 
There is no evidence in this case that officers were engaged in or contemplated any 
other investigation (lawful or otherwise) concerning Topanotes, and there is no indication 
that officers contemplated or believed they ultimately would have discovered a controlled 
substance in Topanotes' possession if they had pursued some lawful course of action. In the 
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absence of facts to support the existence of a lawful investigation, the inevitable-discovery 
doctrine is inapplicable. See Larsen, 127 F.3d at 987; see also Nix. 467 U.S. at 444. 
C. THE ANALYSIS SHOULD END HERE. WITHOUT FURTHER 
PROCEEDINGS IN THE TRIAL COURT ON THE MATTER. 
In this case, application of the inevitable-discovery rule as a unique remedy to the 
constitutional violation is not apparent from the record. The state did not argue the issue or 
present evidence in the trial court concerning the matter. (See record in general.) Topanotes 
was not on notice of the possible application of such a unique remedy and she had no 
opportunity to cross-examine Officers Hansen or Mitchell in connection with its possible 
application. See Montoya. 937 P.2d at 149-50. In this case, the inevitable-discovery 
doctrine may not serve as an alternative basis for affirmance. Id 
Furthermore, remand for additional proceedings is inappropriate and unnecessary in 
this matter for several reasons: First, remand would be unprecedented and fundamentally 
unfair. See infra. Point II. The state bears the burden of proof in establishing application 
of the inevitable-discovery doctrine. Nix. 467 U.S. at 444. In this matter, the state filed 
papers relating to its argument that the controlled substance was admissible under Fourth 
Amendment law, participated in oral argument, and presented witnesses to testify. (R. 67-
71; 88; 98.) The state was given a full and fair opportunity to present the evidence it deemed 
relevant to its admissibility argument in the matter. After the evidentiary hearing, the trial 
court made its ruling on the facts that the state chose to present. Based on the evidence the 
state presented in the matter, there is nothing in the record to support that the officers 
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ultimately would have discovered the controlled substance through lawful means. 
This Court should decide the issues based on the record the state chose to create in 
this matter. To that end, as a result of failing to elicit information concerning the inevitable-
discovery doctrine, the state failed to develop a factual predicate in the trial court to justify 
application of the inevitable-discovery doctrine and it failed in its burden of proof. The 
state's failure to meet its burden is a sufficient basis for ruling that the inevitable-discovery 
doctrine is inapplicable. See Case. 884 P.2d at 1278 (trial court's order denying motion to 
suppress reversed where the state failed to present sufficient evidence to justify its position 
under the Fourth Amendment); State v. Hodson. 907 P.2d 1155, 1159-60 (Utah 1995) 
("[On] the basis of the evidence now on the record, this search should not be upheld"; state 
failed to present sufficient evidence); State v. Gutierrez. 864 P.2d 894, 903 (Utah App. 
1993) (based on evidence the state elected to submit, case would not be remanded for further 
proceedings; the state's evidence was insufficient to uphold confession under Miranda): 
Barnett v. U.S., 525 A.2d 197, 200 (D.C. 1987) (where government failed to meet its 
burden, it would not be given second chance on remand). 
Second, remand for further proceedings on the inevitable-discovery doctrine is 
inappropriate from a policy standpoint since the unlawful officer conduct described in this 
case compels application of the exclusionary rule. The officers in this matter testified they 
routinely detain individuals on the street - without reasonable articulable suspicion to 
believe such individuals have committed a crime - in order that officers may run a warrants 
check on them. That routine practice offends basic principles of the Fourth Amendment. 
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The officers in this case may only begin to comprehend the offensive nature of their 
unlawful, intrusive conduct against an individual's personal liberties if the exclusionary rule 
is applied here. The exclusionary rule would deter these officers from engaging in further 
unlawful routine practices, as described herein, and it would remove all incentives for the 
officers to make such unlawful seizures common place. Simply, this is a case for application 
of the exclusionary rule. 
POINT II. THE COURT OF APPEALS' REMAND ORDER FOR A 
FACTUAL DETERMINATION AND ADDITIONAL PROCEEDINGS IS 
OVERLY BROAD. IN THE EVENT THE CASE MUST BE REMANDED FOR 
FURTHER PROCEEDINGS ON THE INEVITABLE-DISCOVERY 
DOCTRINE. THAT REMAND ORDER MUST BE LIMITED TO 
PROCEEDINGS ON THE EXISTING RECORD. 
A. REMAND FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS OCCURS UNDER LIMITED 
CIRCUMSTANCES THAT DO NOT EXIST HERE. 
Utah appellate courts have remanded cases for further proceedings and additional 
findings in limited circumstances. Specifically, if a trial court has addressed a particular rule 
of law in the original proceedings but has entered inadequate findings and the facts of record 
are in conflict on the matter, an appellate court may remand the case for additional findings. 
See State v. Palmer. 803 P.2d 1249, 1253-54 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (where state raised 
inevitable discovery doctrine in trial court, case would be remanded for findings on the 
matter), cert, denied. 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991). In addition, Utah appellate courts have 
specified that remand is limited to the entry of findings based on the facts already exiting in 
the record. See State v. Giron. 943 P.2d 1114,1121 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
In State v. Giron. 943 P.2d 1114, the trial court considered and misapplied the 
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incident-to-arrest exception in the original proceedings. On appeal, the court of appeals 
articulated the appropriate legal standard for application of that doctrine, and remanded the 
case "for the trial court to apply the law as set forth in this opinion on the evidence 
previously presented to the trial court at the hearing on the motion to suppress." Id. at 1121; 
see also State v. Lopez. 873 P.2d 1127, 1140 (Utah 1994) (lower court misapplied law as 
it related to the "pretext doctrine" requiring remand for findings under correct application 
of the law); State v. GenovesL 871 P.2d 547,548-50,552 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (defendant 
argued on appeal that trial court's findings were inadequate; court of appeals remanded for 
findings on the existing record), connected case, Statev.Genovesi, 909 P.2d 916,919 (Utah 
Ct App. 1995). 
In Topanotes1 case, the court of appeals ruled that it needed complete, accurate and 
consistent findings of fact to resolve application of the inevitable-discovery doctrine. 
Topanotes. 2000 UT App 311,1J11. In support of that determination, the court relied on 
Ruckerv.Dalton. 598 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 1979). 
There, a homeowner sued a builder over a contract dispute. Id. at 1337. The 
homeowner claimed that an agreement between the parties held the builder responsible for 
the workmanship on several aspects of the construction project. According to the 
homeowner, the builder's responsibilities were listed on a "bid" relating to the agreement. 
The homeowner also claimed that the builder's work was deficient as it related to those 
aspects of the project, and he requested damages against the builder in the amount of 
$20,000. The builder counterclaimed for $500, which constituted the balance of the price 
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due under the contract. IcL at 1337-38. The case was tried to the court without a jury. Id. 
At the conclusion of trial, the judge entered findings of fact on the matter, and 
determined that the builder was responsible only for one aspect of the construction project. 
The trial judge entered judgment in favor of the homeowner in the amount of $2,000, and 
the homeowner appealed. LI at 1337-38. This Court reviewed the matter and found the 
trial court's findings to be incomplete with respect to issues raised in the proceedings. 
Specifically, there was no indication as to why the trial court found the builder to be 
responsible only with respect to one aspect of the project, when eight aspects were listed on 
the "bid." The findings also were inconsistent on their face. Id. at 1338-39. On that basis, 
this Court remanded the case for proper findings "in accordance with the evidence." Id^ 
The circumstances in Topanotes' case do not compel remand for further proceedings. 
Here, the state raised the inevitable-discovery doctrine for the first time on appeal. The court 
of appeals had an undisputed record of the proceedings. It was required under the law to 
make its own determinations with respect to application of the inevitable-discovery doctrine, 
3
 In State v. Marshall 791 P.2d 880 (Utah Ct. App.), cert denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 
1990), the court of appeals granted a petition for interlocutory appeal to consider a ruling on 
a motion to suppress. Id, at 881. According to the evidence, the officer initiated a traffic 
stop because defendant had malfunctioning equipment. The officer became suspicious that 
defendant was transporting drugs when defendant responded to questions in a manner in 
conflict with the car rental agreement. The officer requested consent to search the car. When 
he came upon four suitcases in the trunk, the defendant claimed they did not belong to him. 
Id. at 882. The officer discovered drugs in the suitcases. Id. 
On appeal, defendant claimed he did not consent to a search of the suitcases; the state 
responded that defendant lacked standing to challenge the search. Because the trial court did 
not make adequate findings and both parties considered the issues to be "pivotal" to the 
appeal, the court of appeals remanded the matter for further proceedings. Id. at 887. 
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where that issue was raised for the first time in the court of appeals. See supra. Point I, 
herein. Instead the court of appeals remanded the case for a factual determination and 
further proceedings on an issue that was not raised in the lower court. The order of remand 
under the circumstances of this case is in conflict with Utah law. See supra. Point I, herein. 
Topanotes respectfully requests that this Court vacate that order as it relates to application 
of the inevitable-discovery doctrine. 
B. REMAND DOES NOT ENTITLE THE STATE TO ANOTHER EVIDENTIARY 
HEARING. THE STATE HAS HAD EVERY OPPORTUNITY IN THE TRIAL 
COURT TO PRESENT THE EVIDENCE IT DEEMED NECES SARY. IT WOULD 
VIOLATE FOURTH AMENDMENT LAW AND THE DUE PROCESS 
PROVISION TO PERMIT THE STATE TO ENGAGE IN ANOTHER 
EVIDENTIARY HEARING AT THIS JUNCTURE. 
The court of appeals' order remanding the case to the trial court for "a factual 
determination on whether the heroin would have been inevitably discovered and for such 
proceedings as may be appropriate," Topanotes, 2000 UT App 311, U12, is overly broad. It 
may be construed in this matter and in subsequent cases to provide the state with a fresh 
opportunity on remand to present evidence on a new Fourth Amendment issue, where the 
state failed in its burden of proof the first time around. Such precedent would violate 
fundamental fairness and due process. See U.S. Const, amend. XIV (ensuring due process 
and fundamental fairness); see also U.S. Const, amend. V (providing that defendant shall 
not be placed twice in jeopardy). 
In the event this Court upholds the court of appeals1 remand order for further 
proceedings on application of the inevitable-discovery doctrine, the order must be limited to 
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proceedings where the trial court will make factual determinations on the evidence already 
existing in the record. 
1. The State Must Present Evidence Prior to the Appeal to Support Admissibility 
Under the Fourth Amendment. 
As a matter of due process and Fourth Amendment law the state has the burden of 
establishing the admissibility of evidence obtained during a warrantless search. See State v. 
Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256, 1263 (Utah 1993) (state bears burden of proof in establishing 
admissibility under the Fourth Amendment); Nix, 467 U.S. at 444 (prosecutor bears burden 
of proof in establishing application of the inevitable-discovery doctrine); James. 2000 UT 
80,116 (same). Where the state has been provided with a full and fair opportunity to present 
the evidence it deems relevant to meet its burden of proof, the state is not entitled to a second 
bite at the apple with a retrospective critique of the issue from an appellate court. That is, 
the state is bound by the record it created during the evidentiary hearing in the original trial 
court proceedings. If a proper factual predicate has not been developed to justify application 
of the inevitable-discovery doctrine, the state is not entitled to another evidentiary hearing 
on the matter. Under Utah case law, it would be improper and fundamentally unfair to 
remand a case for further proceedings on a Fourth Amendment issue in order that the state 
may present additional evidence consistent with the appellate court's retrospective critique 
of the issue. The following cases govern the matter. 
In State v. Case, 884 P.2d 1274 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), defendant claimed the officer 
who searched his car lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct the initial stop. Id at 1275. 
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The trial court disagreed with defendant and denied the motion to suppress. Id. On appeal, 
the court of appeals reversed the trial court's ruling on the basis that the state failed to present 
sufficient evidence to justify the stop. Id. at 1278-80. As that court recognized, the state had 
the initial burden to establish "the articulable factual basis for the reasonable suspicion 
necessary to support an investigative stop." Id. at 1276. Where the state failed to present 
sufficient evidence, it would not be allowed to cure deficiencies on remand. "The deficiency 
in the factual findings was inevitable because the State failed to provide any evidence at all 
regarding the origin of, and basis for, the dispatcher's broadcast [leading to the initial stop]. 
No evidence was presented that could have shed light on the [matter]." Id at 1278. 
In State v. Hodson. 866 P.2d 556 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (HodsonJ), defendant 
appealed the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress and asked the court of appeals to 
examine whether drug enforcement agents conducted an unreasonable search. The court 
remanded the case for additional proceedings. Id, at 564. Thereafter, this Court granted 
certiorari review, and specified that since the state had the burden of proof, it would not be 
entitled to remand in order to put on new evidence: 
Because the burden of showing reasonableness in the amount of force used and the 
safety of any form of "neckholds" lies with the State, it is not entitled to a remand to 
put on new evidence. And on the basis of the evidence now in the record, this search 
should not be upheld. We therefore reverse and order suppression of the evidence 
obtained by excessive force. 
State v.Hodson. 907 P.2d 1155, 1159-60 (Utah 1995) (HodsonJI) (cites omitted). 
In State v. Gutierrez. 864 P.2d 894 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), the trial court refused to 
suppress statements obtained in violation of the law then in effect under Miranda v. Arizona. 
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384 U.S. 436 (1966). On appeal, the state requested remand for an evidentiary hearing. The 
court of appeals agreed with defendant that the authority relied upon by the state did not 
support remand when the state bears the initial burden of proof in the matter. Gutierrez, 864 
P.2d at 903. The court stated the following: 
Having concluded that remanding this case would give the State an 
unprecedented opportunity to bolster or modify the prosecution's original argument, 
taking advantage of a retrospective critique by the State, we find no legal basis for the 
remand requested by the State. Furthermore, remand as requested by the State would 
not be sound judicial policy, as it would permit successive attempts to introduce 
evidence overlooked in prior hearings, thus preventing final conclusion of these 
proceedings. Therefore, we conclude that the State's request for a remand of this case 
is both legally and factually untenable. 
Gutierrez, 864 P.2d at 903 (footnote omitted). 
2. It Would Be Fundamentally Unfair and a Violation of the Double Jeopardy 
Provision and the Fourth Amendment to Provide the State with Another Opportunity 
to Present Evidence on Remand. 
Case law from other jurisdictions provides support for Topanotes' position. In 
Barnett v. United States, 525 A.2d 197 (D.C. 1987), the court determined the facts did not 
support admissibility of the evidence under the Fourth Amendment as argued by the 
government. The court denied the government's request to remand the case for an 
evidentiary hearing. 
We are not persuaded by the government's argument that the case be remanded 
for a further hearing on the motion to suppress to determine whether Officer Willis 
had probable cause to believe appellant had violated § 40-627. We decline to remand 
for a rehearing on the motion for two reasons. 
First, according to Officer Willis' testimony, there was no evidence that 
appellant had refused to identify himself, as required for a valid arrest under § 40-627. 
Secondly, the government failed to meet its burden of proof in its attempt to 
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justify appellant's warrantless arrest. We have held that in the case of a claimed 
Fourth Amendment violation, absent a warrant, the burden is on the government to 
go forward with evidence that will bring the case within one or more exceptions to the 
exclusionary rule so as to vindicate the challenged police misconduct. We are not 
persuaded that the government should have a second chance to elicit facts supporting 
an affirmance of the trial court's ruling as the record indicates that it had a foil and fair 
opportunity to present whatever facts it chose to meet its burden of justifying the 
warrantless arrest and resulting search and seizure. 
IcL at 200 (cites omitted); Ex Parte Hergott 588 So. 2d 911,916 (Ala. 1991) (remand would 
violate Double Jeopardy Clause; state does not get second chance). 
The principles identified above apply with equal force in considering whether remand 
is appropriate for further proceedings relating to application of the inevitable-discovery 
doctrine. To the extent such proceedings would include an evidentiary hearing, that would 
be fundamentally unfair and unprecedented. 
In this case, when the state presented evidence and argument in the trial court 
concerning the seized heroin, it had no way to know whether the trial court would uphold 
the search or find it unlawful. Nevertheless, the state desired one result in the matter: that 
the heroin be admitted into evidence against Topanotes under the Fourth Amendment. To 
that end, the state presented the evidence it deemed relevant to the matter. Indeed, the state 
was given a foil and fair opportunity to present all evidence it considered necessary to a 
determination concerning the admissibility of the heroin. (See.R. 88; 98:3.) 
During the trial court proceedings, the state determined not to present evidence 
concerning application of the inevitable discovery doctrine. See Palmer, 803 P.2d at 1253 
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(state presented evidence in the initial trial court proceedings relating to both an exception 
to the warrant requirement and application of the inevitable-discovery doctrine in the event 
search was deemed unlawful). 
Now, after an appeal on the issues, the state should not be given a second chance — 
or in this case, a third chance (R. 88 (state given opportunity to present evidence it deemed 
relevant); 98:3 (state given opportunity to further address the matter with the court)) — to 
present evidence on matters it failed to raise in the original trial court proceedings. It would 
be fundamentally and procedurally unjust to allow the state to make repeated attempts to 
validate the admissibility of the evidence under the Fourth Amendment, particularly where 
the state now has a specific mission and instructions from the court of appeals as to how to 
cure its prior inadequacies in the matter. On that basis, Topanotes respectfully requests that 
this Court vacate the court of appeals' remand order for further proceedings relating to the 
inevitable-discovery doctrine. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Topanotes respectfully requests that this Court vacate 
the court of appeals' remand order for further proceedings on the inevitable-discovery 
doctrine, a doctrine raised by the state for the first time on appeal. In addition, Topanotes 
requests either that this Court rule on the state's newly raised ground for affirmance, or 
remand the case to the court of appeals for resolution of that issue on the existing record. To 
that end, this Court and/or the court of appeals should find that the inevitable-discovery 
doctrine is inapplicable to this case. 
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In the event this Court deems it necessary to remand this case to the trial court for any 
further proceedings, Topanotes respectfully requests that this Court specifically limit the 
matter to a remand for proceedings on the existing record. 
SUBMITTED this ¥^day of ^ t ^ U . 2001. 
AAA {(A 1/U^hfi> 
LINDA M. JONES 
RALPH DELLAPIANA 
Attorneys for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, LINDA M. JONES, hereby certify that I have caused to be hand-delivered 10 
copies of the foregoing to the Utah Supreme Court, 450 South State Street, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84lM£_, and Jf copies to the Utah Attorney General's Office, Heber M. Wells 
Building, 160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-
0854, this H*~day of dU^^v., 2001. 
DELIVERED to the Supreme Court and the Attorney General's office as set forth 
above, this day of , 2001. 
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Sta te of Utah, 
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v . 
P e a r l T o p a n o t e s , 
P e t i t i o n e r , 
ORDER 
This matter is before the court upon a Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari, filed pursuant to Rule 48, of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition for Writ of Certiorari 
filed on February 13, 2001, by petitioner is granted, and the 
Cross-Petition for Writ of Certiorari filed on March 28, 2001, 
by respondent is granted. 
FOR THE COURT: 
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UTAH SUPREME COURT 
JUL t 8 2001 
No. 20010127-SC ( ^ K ^ 
990708-CA L E R K 0 F T H E COURT 
981920853 
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I hereby certify that on July 23, 2001, a true and correct copy 
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parties listed below: 
MARIAN DECKER 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
160 E 300 S 6TH FL 
PO BOX 140854 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0854 
LINDA M. JONES 
RALPH DELLAPIANA 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 E 500 S STE 300 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
and a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was hand 
delivered to a personal representative of the court (s) listed 
below: 
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE 
ATTN: SUZY CARLSON 
4 50 S STATE ST 
PO BOX 18 60 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-1860 
PAULETTE STAGG 
COURT OF APPEALS 
450 S STATE ST 
PO BOX 140230 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0230 
Deputy Clerk v 
Case No. 20010127-SC 
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE , 981920853 
ADDENDUM B 
^^I^^STATBt.TOPANOTES Utah 695 
Cite as 14 PM 693 (UuhApp. 2000) 
2000 UT App: 311 probable cause to believe an offense has been 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, committed or is being committed. U.S.C A 
ConstAmend. 4. 
Pearl TOPANOTES, Defendant 
and Appellant 
No. 990708-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Nov. 9, 2000. 
Rehearing Denied Dec. 15, 2000. 
Defendant was convicted in the District 
Court, Salt Lake Department, Leslie A. Lew-
is, J., of third degree possession of a con-
trolled substance, and defendant appealed. 
The Court of Appeals, Thome, J., held that: 
(1) officers' detention of defendant during 
time it took them to check for outstanding 
warrants was in violation of defendant's 
Fourth Amendment rights, and (2) whether 
police officers' discovery of defendant's out-
standing warrants supported application of 
inevitable discovery exception to exclusionary 
rule was a question for the trial court, rather 
than the Court of Appeals. 
Reversed and remanded. 
L Criminal Law c=>1139 
The determination of whether an en-
counter with law enforcement officers consti-
tutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment 
is a legal conclusion that the Supreme Court 
reviews for correctness. U.S.C.A. Const. 
Amend. 4. 
2. Arrest <3=>63.4(1), 63.5(4) 
Criminal Law 0=1224(1) 
Three levels of constitutionally permissi-
ble encounters between police officers and 
citizens exist: (1) an officer may approach a 
citizen at anytime and pose questions so long 
as the citizen is not detained against his will; 
(2) an officer may seize a person if the officer 
has an "articulable suspicion" that the person 
has committed or is about to commit a crime; 
however, the detention must be temporary 
and last no longer than is necessary to effec-
tuate the purpose of the stop; and (3) an 
officer may arrest a suspect if the officer has 
3. Arrest <s=»63.5<9) 
Police officers did not have a reasonable 
articulable suspicion that defendant who was 
convicted of possession of a controlled sub-
stance had committed or. was about to com-
mit a crime, and thus officers detention of 
defendant during time it took them to check 
for outstanding warrants was in violation of 
defendant's Fourth Amendment right against 
unreasonable seizures, where reasonable per-
son in defendant's position would not have 
felt free to just walk away. U.S.C.A. Const. 
Amend. 4. 
4. Criminal Law <3=»1134(3), 1181.5(7) 
Whether police officers' discovery of de-
fendant's outstanding warrants supported ap-
plication of inevitable discovery exception to 
exclusionary rule was a question for the trial 
court, rather than the Court of Appeals, ne-
cessitating remand for factual determination 
as to whether heroin discovered on defen-
dant's person would have been inevitably dis-
covered. 
5. Criminal Law <3=>394.1(3) 
To determine whether evidence obtained 
as a result of a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment can be admitted at a defendant's 
trial, the Court of Appeals examines whether 
the evidence has been come at by exploita-
tion of the illegality or by means sufficiently 
distinguishable to be purged of the primary 
taint. U.S.CA Const.Amend. 4. 
6. Criminal Law 0=394.1(3) 
Inevitable discovery is a valid exception 
to the exclusionary rule, and the appropriate 
standard governing the inevitable discovery 
exception is whether the prosecution can es-
tablish by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the information ultimately would have 
been discovered by lawful means; the state 
must show that the evidence would have 
been discovered, not simply that it could or 
might have been discovered. U.S.CA 
ConstAmend. 4. 
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7. Criminal Law <s=>1181(l) 
It is not the function of an appellate 
court to make findings of fact because it does 
not have the advantage of seeing or hearing 
the witnesses testify; moreover, complete, ac-
curate, and consistent findings of fact are 
essential to the resolution of a dispute under 
the proper rule of law. 
Linda M. Jones and Ralph Dellapiana, Salt 
Lake City, for Appellant 
Jan Graham and Marian Decker, Salt 
Lake City, for Appellee. 
Before Judges GREENWOOD, 
JACKSON, and THORNE. 
OPINION 
THORNE, Judge: 
111 Defendant Pearl Topanotes appeals 
from her conviction for possession of a con-
trolled substance, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(2)(a)(i) (Supp.1999). We reverse and re-
mand. 
BACKGROUND 
H2 On October 7, 1998 three Salt Lake 
City police officers detained defendant on a 
public street and requested her identification. 
The officers retained defendant's identifica-
tion, outside her presence, for approximately 
five minutes to check for outstanding war-
rants. The warrant check revealed at least 
one outstanding warrant,1 so the officers ar-
rested defendant. The officers then 
searched defendant and found heroin. De-
fendant was ultimately charged with posses-
sion of a controlled substance. 
113 Defendant moved to suppress the ad-
mission of the heroin. The trial court denied 
the motion, and defendant entered a condi-
tional guilty plea to one count of unlawful 
possession of a controlled substance; howev-
er, she conditioned her plea on the right to 
1. The nature and amount of the outstanding war-
rants) was not disclosed in the record. 
appeal from the trial court's denial of her 
£ motion. 
;
 ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
> [1] 114 Defendant argues that the trial 
e court erred in denying her motion because 
a* the police officers conducted a level-two stop 
without the requisite articulable suspicion. 
"[T]he determination of whether an encoun-
ter with law enforcement officers constitutes 
it a seizure under the Fourth Amendment . . . 
is a legal conclusion that we review for cor-
lt rectness." Soft Lake City v. Ray, 2000 UT 
App 55,118, 998 P.2d 274. 
ANALYSIS 
[2] 115 Three levels of constitutionally 
permissible encounters between police offi-
cers and citizens exist: 
(1) an officer may approach a citizen at 
anytime [sic] and pose questions so long as 
 the citizen is not detained against his will; 
r (2) an officer may seize a person if the 
n officer has an "articulable suspicion" that 
the person has committed or is about to 
u commit a crime: however, the "detention 
must be temporary and last no longer than 
is necessary to effectuate the purpose of 
the stop;" (3) an officer may arrest a sus-
pect if the officer has probable cause to 
i believe an offense has been committed or 
 is being committed. 
L
 Id. (quoting State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 
- 617-18 (Utah 1987)) (per curiam) (alteration 
V in original) (citation omitted). 
16 We addressed a similar situation in 
Ray.2 In that case, two police officers ap-
proached the defendant as she stood on a 
1
 walkway near a convenience store. See id. at 
114. The officers asked for and then retained 
the defendant's identification to check for 
outstanding warrants, a process which took 
 about five minutes. See id. Before finally 
1 determining the defendant's warrant status, 
 one of the officers asked to search her bags. 
1 See id. The defendant consented to the 
 search, and the officer found drug parapher-
) nalia. See id. at 116. The officers then ar-
2. The Utah Court of Appeals decided Ray on 
March 2, 2000, about eight months after the trial 
court decided this matter. 
rested her and charged her with possessing 
drug paraphernalia. See id at 1M 6-7. 
117 The defendant moved to suppress the 
admission of the drug paraphernalia. See id 
at H 7. Following a hearing on the motion, the 
trial court determined that the encounter did 
not violate the defendant's Fourth Amend-
ment rights and denied the motion. See id. 
On appeal, we reversed the trial court, ex-
plaining that "[g]iven the totality of the cir-
cumstances, it is clear that a reasonable per-
son in [defendant's] position would not feel 
free to just walk away, thereby abandoning 
her identification " See id at 1113 (emphasis 
added). 
[3] H 8 In the present matter, after exam-
ining the "totality of the circumstances" sur-
rounding the encounter between the officers 
and defendant, we believe that "a reasonable 
person in [defendant's] position would not 
feel free to just walk away, thereby abandon-
ing her identification." Id Accordingly, we 
conclude that the detention was a level two 
detention made without articulable suspicion 
in violation of defendants Fourth Amend-
ment rights.3 
[4,5] 19 We must next address whether 
the evidence resulting from the violation can 
be admitted at defendant's trial. Thus, we 
examine " "whether . . . the evidence has 
been come at by exploitation of [the] illegali-
ty or by means sufficiently distinguishable to 
be purged of the primary taint.'" State v. 
Northrup, 756 P.2d 1288,1294 (Utah CtApp. 
1988) (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 
371 U.S. 471, 488, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed^d 441 
(1963)). Furthermore, we must "determine 
whether the [search of Topanotes] fall[s] 
within the recognized limited exceptions to 
the Fourth Amendment warrant require-
ment." State v. Genovesi 909 P.2d 916, 919 
(Utah CtApp.1995). 
r
 [6] U 10 The State argues that the offi-
cer's discovery of defendant's outstanding 
warrants supports the application of the inev-
itable discovery exception to this case. Inev-
3u The State concedes, on appeal, in light of Ray, 
- that by failing to immediately return defendant's 
* identification card, the encounter escalated to a 
i .'level-two detention. The State also concedes 
that the police officers had no "articulable suspi-
STATE v. TOPANOTES Utah 697 
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itable discovery is a valid exception to the 
exclusionary rule, see State v. Northrup. 756 
P.2d 1288, 1293 (Utah CtApp.1988). and 
"[t]he appropriate standard governing the 
inevitable discover}' exception is whether the 
prosecution can establish by a preponderance 
of the evidence that the information ultimate-
ly would have been discovered by lawful 
means.'" State v. James, 2000 LT 80, « 16, 
405 Utah Adv. Rep. 31 (quoting Nix v. 
Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 
81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984)). More precisely, the 
State " 'must show that the evidence 'would' 
have been discovered, not simply that it 
"could" or "might" have been discovered.'" 
M.V v. State, 1999 UT App 104, 112, 977 
P.2d 494 (quoting Genovesi 909 P.2d at 923 
n. 8) (alterations in original). 
[7] H 11 Because the trial court ruled that 
the initial detention was legal, the issue of 
inevitable discovery was not addressed be-
low. "This court has consistently recognized 
that [issues of search and seizure] are highly 
fact sensitive," State v. Lovegren, 798 PJM 
767, 770 (Utah CtApp.1990), and "[i]t is not 
the function of an appellate court to make 
findings of fact because it does not have the 
advantage of seeing or hearing the witnesses 
testify." Rucker v. Daltcm, 598 P.2d 1336, 
1338 (Utah 1979). Moreover, "complete, ac-
curatef,] and consistent findings of fact . . . 
[are] essential to the resolution of dispute 
under the proper rule of law." Id. 
1112 Therefore, we remand for a factual 
determination on whether the heroin would 
have been inevitably discovered and for such 
proceedings as may be appropriate. 
1113 WE CONCUR: PAMELA T. 
GREENWOOD, Presiding Judge and 
NORMAN H. JACKSON, Associate 
Presiding Judge. 
cion" that defendant had "committed or was 
about to commit a crime," ana therefore the 
detention was a seizure in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment. 
ADDENDUM C 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT IV 
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affir-
mation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Sec. 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appoint-
ment] 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to 
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each 
State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election 
for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States, 
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or 
the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabit-
ants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United 
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other 
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion 
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of 
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of 
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the 
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a 
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of 
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to 
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrec-
tion or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies 
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such 
disability. 
Sec. 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the 
Confederacy and claims not to be paid.] 
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, 
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in 
suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the 
United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation in-
curred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any 
claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations, 
and claims shall be held illegal and void. 
Sec. 5. [Power to enforce amendment] 
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the 
provisions of this article. 
ADDENDUM D 
Tiiird Judicial District 
JUL 2 8 1999 
In the Third Judicial D i s t r i c t Court 
In and For S a l t Lake County, State of Utah sALTLAK^ couarY U t a h SALT LAKECOU* nr 
Deputy Clerk 
The State of Utah 
Plaintiff 
V.S. 
Pearl topanotes 
Defendant 
Judgment, Sentence (commitment) 
Case No. 981920853 
Count No. 1 
Honorable Leslie A Lewis 
Clerk M Snarr 
Video 9:55 am 
Bailiff Angie Chichis 
Date 7/28/99 
There being no legal or other reason why sentence should not be 
imposed, and defendant having been convicted by a a jury/ the 
court, X plea of guilty; plea of no contest; of the offense 
of Possession of a herion, a controlled substance 58-37-8(2) (a) (i) , 
a felony of the 3rd degree, Class a misdemeanor, being present 
in court and ready for sentence and represented by Ralph 
Dellapina, and the State being represented by Mark Kouris , is now 
adjudged guilty of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in 
the Utah State Prison: 
. years 
amount of $. 1,000.00 Plus 
X To an indeterminate term of 0-5 
X And ordered to pay a fine in the 
an 85% surcharge 
And ordered to pay restitution in the amount of 5 
Such sentence is to run concurrently/consecutively with 
Defendant is granted a stay of above ( Prison) sentence 
and placed on probation in the custody of this Court 
and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah 
State Department of Adult Parole for the period of 
, pursuant to the attached conditions of probation. 
X Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt 
Lake County X for delivery to the Utah State Prison, Draper, 
Utah, or For delivery to the Salt Lake county Jail, where 
defendant shall be confined and imprisoned lj^rf^eotdance with 
this judgment and commitment 
X Commitment shall issue forthwith 
Dated this 2flth Day of 
strict Court Judge Leslie Lewis 
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Judge's Prison Term Recommendation 
State of Utah vs Pearl Topanotes CR 981920853 
Honorable L Lewis 
Pursuant to the provisions of 77-18-5, Utah code Annotated, 1953 
as amended 1980, I recommend the following. 
1. The defendant be given credit for time served of 55 davs 
while in the Salt Lake County Jail. 
2. The fine be cut in half once she has obtained her G.E.D. 
Dated thTs^28th Day ^of July//''T)999 
Judge Leslie A Lewis 
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